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Abstract
In this study, the main attention is paid to the problem of “shadowing” the Ukrainian 
economy in the crisis period. Theoretical approaches to determining the functions of 
taxes and factors affecting real tax revenues were studied. A scientific study was carried 
out which would reveal the motives for the behavior of taxpayers, which are explic-
itly or implicitly laid in the basis of approaches to the formation of the mechanism of 
taxation and tax policy of the state. Therefore, we tried to determine the reasons why 
the behavior of each individual taxpayer is completely determined by his individual 
rational choice, determined by the desire to maximize his own benefit, i.e. does not 
depend on the choice of the tax behavior of other agents and the effects that individual 
taxpayers have on each other. Our results show that the reduction of transaction costs 
in the legal sector of the economy and the creation of conditions that impede the illegal 
conduct of transactions are not sufficient conditions for the implementation of formal 
taxation rules.
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INTRODUCTION
To manage the tax processes is very important for exposing the tax behav-
ior regularity of the economic agents and also accept these main factors 
which influences for the taking decisions for paying taxes.
The review of the literature below shows that the purpose of the research 
taxation problem is based on the common assumption that the tax payers 
themselves break the rules acting as the rational agents comparing ben-
efits and expenses with the risks uncertainty. Out coming from this as-
sumption there are taxation parameters as the main factors determining 
the tax revenues .From these factors it is not possible to accept the influ-
ence for the tax behavior this influence on tax behavior of social. This 
influence on tax behavior of social-psychological factors, such as belief, 
behavioral installations, conformism, social influence, etc. which action 
connect with the information and economic interaction of agents them-
selves and with their social and economic relations.
The purpose of this project consists of in specification of representations 
about of tax behaviour laws of economic agents on the basis of revealing 
and influence on the social – psychological factors. 
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1. MATERIALS  
AND METHODS
The statistics shows a growing role of shadow sector 
of Ukraine economy. Having studied the informa-
tion authors stated in publications (Kuz’minchuk, 
2012; Rejkіn, V. S., 2016; Ministry of Economic 
Development & Trade of Ukraine, 2016; Zuєva, 
Dragan, 2004; Antonenko, Burluc’kij, 2004; 
Vishnevs’kij, 2004; Kraus, 2007; Ozers’kij, 2005; 
Pushkarenko, Logvinenko, 2004; Harazіshvіlі, 
2006; Shablіsta, 2000) that it is possible to draw 
a unfavorable conclusion that the Ukraine bud-
get receives less because economic agents evasion 
from taxes payment of in the budget and trust 
funds. According this database of experts of the 
Ministry of Economics of Ukraine in «shadow» 
there are above 120 billion grn., and according to 
Department of economic strategy of the Ministry 
of Economics for 9 months of 2016 the level black 
economy has made 50% (Ministry of Economic 
Development and Trade of Ukraine, 2016). 
Practical value of this received results will consist 
of perfection of forecasting taxes receipts, gather-
ing and obligatory payments in the budget and 
trust funds, increase budgetary process at differ-
ent levels of the government development of scien-
tific bases of formation of a tax policy of the state.
The publication analysis (Kuz’minchuk, 2012; 
Zima, Kuz’minchuk, 2011; Vasylevs’ka, 2003; 
Іvanov, 2003; Lunina, 2000; Merkulova, 2006; 
Ministry of Economy of Ukraine, 2006; Ogon’, 
1997; Lysenko, Mishhenko, Rudenskij, Spiridonov, 
2002) shows a presence problem of some differing 
approaches to definition of social and economic 
purpose, functions of taxes and the factors influ-
encing on the real tax revenues. 
From this point of view research interest repre-
sents the discussion of those concepts about mo-
tives of behavior of tax bearers which are obvious-
ly or implicitly pawned in the basis of approaches 
to formation of the mechanism of the taxation and 
a tax policy of the state.
According to the concept of minimization, trans-
action costs the agents choose legal or illegal way 
of carrying out of transactions by comparison of 
the submission price to the law (Olejnik, 2002). 
Cost of legal activity is connected with necessity 
of tax payments and secured the social guarantees 
to the personnel. The illegal activity includes the 
following basic elements: the costs connected to 
evasion from legal sanctions (costs on conducting 
“double” accounts, a payment to advisers, bribes 
to tax inspectors and other supervising persons), 
loss of benefit from restriction of opportunities 
of enterprise activity (carrying out of advertising 
campaigns, a capture of credits, capitalization of 
the property, use of legal contracts, realization of 
long-term projects).
From the concept of performance of fiscal func-
tion of the state (Kraus, 2007; Ogon’, 1997; Sverdan, 
2004) the mechanism of the taxation should pro-
vide monetary receipts proceeding in the state 
funds in quantity, sufficient for performance by 
the state of the obligations taken before a soci-
ety. The researches spent within the framework of 
this concept, are directed on creation of effective 
mechanisms of the control of tax bearers and the 
organizations of tax service.
The concept of stimulation of tax bearers 
(Vasylevs’ka, 2003; Іvanov, 2003; Lunina, 2000; 
Mel’nik, 2001) proceeds from necessity of such 
choice of kinds of taxes, tax rates and bases which 
would allow to keep or even to develop economic 
potential of tax bearers. One direction of research-
es within the framework of this concept is based 
on search of opportunities of increase in tax reve-
nues by decrease in tax burden due to use of the ef-
fect displayed by curve Laffera (model Leviafana) 
(Merkulova, 2006).
In Merkulova (2006), we see, that the main rea-
son of opportunistic motivation is the individual 
estimation of taxes equivalence and the blessings 
received from the state, and realization of such 
motivation depends on economic feasibility of in-
fringement which is determined by incomes and 
the losses, connected with evasion from taxes. 
According to this concept of productive function 
of the state (Іvanov, 2003; Lysenko, Mishhenko, 
Rudenskij, Spiridonov, 2002; Merkulova, 2006; 
Merkulova, Mihajlenko, 2007; Pilipchenko, O. O., 
2015) tax revenues should be spent for actions on 
increase of efficiency of all economic system func-
tioning so that to compensate the taxes paid by 
agents, the blessings of public use given to agents 
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in exchange. For maintenance of conformity of di-
rections and the sizes of budgetary funds expenses 
with sources and the sizes of their receipt regula-
tion of budgetary process on a basis intercordance 
norms of the taxation and use of the state budget-
ary is offered.
The general common unit for the considered the 
assumption concepts will be, that the behavior of 
each separate payer of taxes is completely deter-
mined by the individual rational choice caused 
by aspiration to maximization of own benefit, i.e. 
does not depend on a choice of tax behavior of 
other agents and influences which are rendered 
against each other by separate tax payers.
For tax behavior research of agents is volumes 
definition of shadow economy. The Russian sci-
entists (Nikitin, Stepanova, Glazova, 2005) mark 
existence of variety of methods of measurement 
of shadow economy. Though “all these methods 
for the lack of any official statistics are rather ap-
proximate and conditional” (Nikitin, Stepanova, 
Glazova, 2005) authors allocate the basic from 
them – a method of physical expenses and a meth-
od of cash which is used alongside with a method 
of the electric power and is used basically in less 
developed countries. Except for these methods the 
methods of expert estimations are based on re-
search of selective number of facilities, multifacto-
rial dynamic models are used on definition of a di-
vergence between official and actual employment.
Today in Ukraine the scientific – methodological 
base is not in full developed for the analysis and 
forecasting of shadow economy which would take 
into account all specific sides of public, industri-
al, distributive, cost, monetary and financial rela-
tions. There is a number of approaches and me-
thodical recommendations (Borodjuk, Turchynov, 
Pryhod’ko, 1997; Ivanov, 2009; Ministry of 
Economy of Ukraine, 2006; Nesterenko, 2003; 
Nikitin, Stepanova, Glazova, 2005; Jurinec’, 
Londar, 1999; Ribchak, O. S., 2013) for the defi-
nition and an estimation of shadow economy 
volumes.
Ministry of Economics of Ukraine “Design proce-
dure of volumes of shadow economy” (Economy of 
Ukraine, 2006) assumes the definition of volumes 
of unregister economic activities on the basis of 
use of the statistical information by the following 
methods: financial; monetary; electric; a method 
“expenses of the population – retail trade”. The giv-
en method is, in our opinion, the optimal at calcu-
lation of volumes of shadow economy, as assumes 
use of the acting statistical information which can 
be accessible to the broad audience of consumers. 
Beside it this method allows to estimate in full 
enough scales of shadow processes more exactly. 
We shall name productive and economic system 
(PES). Researches which we shall be carried out, 
are based on resulted dynamic model of tax be-
havior PES and the preliminary theoretical anal-
ysis results of this model. The researched model 
contains the uncertain parameters describing 
social – psychological factors, influencing on tax 
bearers. Problems of the project will consist in the 
following: 
• to identify uncertain parameters of model 
on the basis of the tax payers statistical 
information on legal persons (the industrial 
enterprises of the Kharkov region), tax rev-
enues (value-added tax);
• to estimate accuracy of parameters identi-
fication of and on this stage to make a deci-
sion about adequacy of model or to spend 
researches of its modification.
Calculation of the variables used in researches, is 
carried out in two stages. At the first stage the val-
ue added volumes 1 ,
tα Σ  2ta Σ  official carrying out of 
operations and illegal manufactures of the in cost 
expression on t-period of time, 1,  2,  ..., ,t τ=  
where t  – number of one quarter in our research-
es, 32τ =  (the period of time from 2010 to 2016). 
And also there are the minimal 
minq  and maximal 
maxq  values specific size q  of losses carrying out 
the illegal operations which are determined.
Volumes parameters of 
1
tα Σ  1,  2,  ) (t τ= …  
value added cost in Statistics year-book on 
the Kharkov region. Value of parameter 
2
ta Σ  
1,  2,  ) (t τ= …  is calculated on the basis of the 
Design procedure of volumes of shadow economy 
(Nikitin, Stepanova, Glazova, 2005). For parame-
ter calculation is used the following documentary 
form: the form 11-MTP “The Report on using re-
sults of fuel, the heat power and the electric pow-
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er”, the form 24-power “Electrobalance, structure 
of the power equipment and the report on work 
about power stations (electrogenerating instal-
lations)”, the form 1 “Balance”, the form 2 “The 
Report on financial results”, the form 5 “Notes to 
the annual financial reporting”, and also the data 
of the Statistics year-books on the Kharkov region 
(considering each year), the Kharkov regional 
Management of statistics, the Statistics of Ukraine, 
National bank of Ukraine, the State tax inspection 
in Kharkov region.
The data on an interval [ ]min max,  q q  uncertainty of 
parameter q  is supposed to receive by the super-
visers questioning of the enterprises. Results of ev-
eryone ( )1,  2  i m= …  questioning will receive 
ranges 
min max,  i iλ λ    possible values ,iλ  where 
iλ  – specific size (for the normative tax amount) 
definition of agent benefit or losses when the tax-
es are not paid, m  – the number of questioning 
ones. On sizes 
min max,  i iλ λ  for the everyone ques-
tioning is defined the interval min max,  
i iq q    pos-
sible values .iq  Proceeding from set min max,  
i iq q  ( )1,  2,   ³ m= …  an interval [ ]min max,  q q  is de-
termined by the possible values for PES as a whole.
In conformity with 1
tα Σ  and 2tα Σ  frequency is cal-
culated 
tp  official carrying out by the operations 
agent on the every t-period. On the basis of siz-
es min max,  q q  find the parameter R  – the factor 
which is taking into a range of “disorder” of possi-
ble values .q  A time number ,  1,  2,  ..., tp t τ=  
and parameter R  consider as known parameters 
of economic-mathematical model of reflective in-
ertial behavior of agents PES.
At the second stage a method of the least squares 
(MLS) according to the formula (4) is calculated 
parameters ( )0 1 2,  ,  ,  1,  2 ,i i is s s i =  determin-
ing frequencies ( ) 1,  2,  ..., tp t τ=  official car-
rying out by the agent of operations (see formulas 
(1), (Vasenko, 2016). Under formulas (2), (5) is cal-
culated parameter b with dependence of ( )tB p  
determining the maximal losses,
 
coefficient
 
of 
proportionality 1 2,  c c  defining change direc-
tion frequencies ,tp  parameter d of dependence ( )1 2,  ,  t t tD p p p− −  benefits and loses connected 
by increasing or decreasing the changes rate fre-
quencies .tp  Parameters 1 2,  ,  b c c  and d  are the 
main research ones on the base of interpreter the 
resalts.
2. RESULTS
The tax agent behaviour of PES is counted by se-
quence of sizes ( )1,  2,  ...,  ,tp t τ=  where t  – 
number of the period of time of functioning PES 
to which it corresponds an interval of time ( )1 ,  ,t t− ∆ ∆    ∆  – the fixed time interval (quar-
ter), 
tp  – frequency of official carrying out by the 
operations agent on -period,t  1 ,
t
t
t
p
α
α=  1
tα  – are 
the volume of manufacture (works, services) in 
the cost expression, corresponding officially car-
ried out to the operations on an interval of time ;t  
1 2 ,
t t tα α α= −  2,  t tα α  are the – total amount and 
volume illegal manufactures (works, services) in 
cost expression on -periodt  of time.
According to “classical” representations about tax 
behavior of agent PES the prize at the end of the 
period of time t makes the size resulted in the 
formula:
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )
1 1 1
1 ,
t t t t t
AK
t t
B p n p q p
q n p q
α
α
⋅ = − ⋅ + − ⋅ − ⋅ =
= − ⋅ + −
 
where 1 tp−  – frequency illegal carrying out 
of operations by the agent on an interval of 
time ;t   n  – specific size of taxes, [ )0,  1 ;n∈  
q  – specific size of losses carrying out of illegal 
operations, 0.q ≥
The condition 
tρ  corresponding the maximal ex-
pected prize at the end of the period of time ,t  is 
formed from the condition:
( ) ( ) [ ]{ }max 0,  1 .t t t t tAK AKB B g gρ = ⋅ ∈
It is obvious, that 1,
tρ =  if ;q n>  0,tρ =  if 
.q n<  It is supposed, that the agent during the pe-
riod of time t realizes a condition .t tp ρ=  Thus, 
in «classical» model of tax behavior uncertainty of 
size q and previous behaviour PES in this connec-
tion it appears is not taken into account, that the 
agent reaches {achieves} the optimum condition 
tρ  “instantly”, for one period of time.
Generally the size q  of specific losses because of 
illegal carrying out of operations is represented 
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to the agent in uncertain size, [ ]min max,  ,q q q∈  
where min max,  q q  – the minimal and maximal 
possible values of size .q  In connection with un-
certainty of size q to conditions 0tρ =  and 1tρ =  
generally there does not correspond the maximal 
utility. Tax bearers to a greater or lesser extent re-
alize, that tax revenues are spent for the decision of 
such social problems which reflect also their own 
problems. Therefore full “leaving from taxes” con-
tradicts values of agents, it is represented to them 
immoral. At the same time, partial nonpayment 
of taxes by many agents is justified. It will be argu-
ments, that for business the aspiration to economy 
of any expenses is natural, and that the paid part 
of taxes has enough for the decision of essential 
social problems. Thus, in process of approach of a 
condition 
tp  to 0 or to 1 “moral losses” the agent, 
grows caused by the psychological discomfort by 
him. In this sense minimal (equal 0) losses corre-
spond to a situation 0.5.tp =  
Taking into account uncertainty of size ,q  util-
ity ( )t tA pΠ  for agent PES of his condition tp  we 
shall present in the following:
( ) ( )( ) ( )1 ,t t t t tA cp Hp q B pΠ α= + − ⋅ −
where H  – an estimation of size q-n in view of 
uncertainty of parameter ,q  ( ) ,cH R q n= ⋅ −  
R  – the factor which is taking into account of a 
range of “disorder” of possible values ,q
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
min max
2
1
,
1 c
n n n q q n
R
n n q n
⋅ − − − ⋅ −= ⋅ − + −  
min max
2
c
q q
q
+=  – average value of size q specific 
losses, ( )tB p  – size of “moral losses” agent in a 
case when his condition 
tp  appears and closes to 
extremely possible conditions 0 or 1. 
Let’s see, that with reduction of a range min maxq q−  
possible values q from 1 up to 0 value R  grows 
from 0 up to 1. Thus 
( ) ( )min max 0,n q q n− ⋅ − <  
 if minn q<  or max ;q n<  
( ) ( )min max 0,n q q n− ⋅ − <  if min max .q n q< <
For expression of the losses arising the affinity to 
limiting conditions, we shall choose the following 
form:
( ) ( )( )0.25 1 ,t t tB p b p p= − ⋅ −  
where b  – parameter of dependence ( ) ,tB p  determining the maximal losses: ( ) ( )0.25 0 1 .b B B= =  Thus ( )0.5 0.B =
Prize of each agent PES on an interval of time ,t  
received by him as a result of change of a condi-
tion 
1tp −  on a condition ,tp  we determine in size
1 2
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 2
( , , )
( ) , ,
( ) , ,
t t t t t
A A
t t t t
A A
t t t t
A A
B B p p p
B p C D if p p
B p C D if p p
- -
-
-
= =
ìï =P - - £ï=íï =P - - £ïî
where
 iC
 – size of expenses and the losses aris-
ing because of change of a condition of the agent,
 
1 1 2( ,  ) ( ,  ) ,  1,  2;i i
t t t tp p pC C c ip− −= ==
ic  – the factor of proportionality which is taking in-
to account a direction of change of a condition of the 
agent, 1,  2;i =  D  – size of expenses and the loss-
es caused by increase or reduction of rate of chang-
es, ( ) ( )21 2 2,  ,  ;t t t tD D p p p dg d p h− −= = = −  
d  – parameter of dependence ( )1 2,  ,  ;t t tD D p p p− −=
g  – a difference between rates of chang-
es on intervals of time t and 1,t −  ( )1 1 2 ,t t t tg p p p p− − −= − − −  1 22 .t th p p− −= −  
Introduction of parameters ( )1,  2 ,iC i =  D  al-
lows to take into account that circumstance, that 
the choice agents of the actions occurs not only 
depending on an estimation of the current benefit, 
but also under influence developed practical activ-
ity and tendencies of their change.
Conditionally optimum condition ,tioptp  1,  2,i =  
corresponding to increase 1i −  or to reduction 
2i =  frequencies of official carrying out by the 
agent of operations, is from the formula: 
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( ) ( )
( )
11 2 2
2 0.
t
t t tAi
it
t
dB
R b p c p p
dp
d p h
−= + − − − −
− − =
 
Also makes size 
1 2
0 1 2 ,
ti t t
opt i i ip s s p s p
− −= + ⋅ − ⋅  (1)
where 
0 ,i
R b
s
v
+=  1 2 ,ii c ds
v
+=  2 ,i ds
v
=  (2)
.iv b c d= + +  Thus the agent on an interval of 
time t  chooses such condition 
,t tioptp p=  (3)
To which there corresponds the greatest possible 
prize :tAB
( )
( ){ }
1 2
1 2
,  ,  
max ,  ,  ,  1,  2 .
t t t t
A
t ti t t
Ai opt
B p p p
B p p p i
− −
− −
=
= =  (4)
If the agent on each interval of time t chooses the 
condition according to conditions (1), (4) we shall 
speak, that he operates according to reflective in-
ertial behaviour (REP) model. 
If all agents PES operate according to model RIB 
and PES as a whole will show reflective inertial be-
havior. Condition PES will be defined by frequen-
cy 
tp  of official carrying out by agents PES of the 
operations. The size 
tp  will pay off under the for-
mula: 
1 ,
t t tp α αΣ Σ=  where to sizes 1 ,   t tα αΣ Σ  
there correspond the sums of value 1 ,   
t tα α  all 
agents PES. Utility for PES these conditions 
tp  
will be expressed to be defined by the formula: 
( )( ) ( )1 ,t t t tcH p q B pαΣ ΣΠ = ⋅ + − ⋅ −  
and its prize received as a result of change of a con-
dition 
1tp −  on a condition ,tp  will be defined by 
size ( )1 2,  ,  .t t t t tB B p p p− −Σ Σ= ⋅  
1 2
1
1 1
1
1 2
( , , )
( , ,
( , .
t t t t t
t t t t t
t t t t t
B B p p p
B p C D if p p
B p C D if p p
− −
∑ Σ
−
∑ ∑
−
∑ ∑
= =
 = ∏ − − ≥=  = ∏ − − ≥
Thus model RIB PES will be described by the for-
mula (1) and the following condition:
( )
( ){ }
1 2
1 2
,  ,  
max ,  ,  ,  1,  2 .
t t t t
t ti t t
i opt
B p p p
B p p p i
− −
Σ
− −
Σ
=
= =
3. DISCUSSION
Parameters 0 1 2,  ,  i i is s s  models RIB are on 
the basis of the data on actual frequencies ( )1,  2,  ...,  tp t τ=  official carrying out by 
agents PES of the operations on a method of the 
least squares from a condition:
( )
( )
( )
( )
0 1 2
0 1 2
2
1 2
0 1 2
,  ,  
,  k ,  k
min  
+k
1,  2 ,
i
i i i i
i i i i
t t t
i i i
t T
s s s
k
k p k p p
i
σ
σ
− −
∈
=
=  =  = − −  
=
∑  (5)
where iT  – set of the periods of time correspond-
ing to increase ( )1i =  or decrease ( )2i =  of fre-
quency 
tp  of official carrying out of operations;( )0 1 2,  k ,  ki i i ikσ  – size is nonviscous for sample 
,  1,  2,iT i =  corresponding to values 0 1 2,  k ,  ki i ik  
parameters of model RIB. 
Accuracy of identification of parameters of model 
RIB can be appreciated by sizes:
( ) ( )0 1 2,  ,   1,  2 ,i
cp
s s s
K i
p
σ= =  
where ,
c
t
cp
t T i
p
p
T∈
=∑  iT  – quantity of elements in 
sample .iT
Formula (2) establishes conformity between 
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parameters 0 1 2,  ,  i i is s s  and sizes ,  c ,  d.ib  
Considering formula (2) as with three unknown 
sizes ,  c ,  dib  is possible to receive system of the 
equations:
( )0 1 2,  ,  ,b i i ib s s sϕ= ( )0 1 2,  ,  ,ii c i i ic s s sϕ=  
( )0 1 2,  ,  ,d i i id s s sϕ=  ( )1,  2 .i =  (6)
The values of sizes designed on these expressions 
,  c ,  dib  define actual “contribution” to behavior 
of agents of factors corresponding to them: «mor-
al losses», arising because of affinity to limiting 
conditions, and also expenses and the losses aris-
ing because of change of a condition of the agent, 
and caused by increase or reduction of rate of 
changes. If results of calculations will show, that ( )0.1,  ,  ,  0 1,  2 ,i iK b c d i≤ > =  it is possible 
to draw a conclusion on adequacy of model RIB.
CONCLUSIONS
Thus, the main result of the project should be a scientific substantiation of model RIB. Researches 
should show, that decrease transaction costs in legal sector of economy and creation of the condi-
tions complicating illegal carrying out of transactions, are not sufficient conditions for performance 
of formal norms of the taxation. The proof of adequacy of model RIB will allow to confirm the fol-
lowing assumptions:
Dynamics of functioning PES essentially depends on initial propensity of agents to realization of 
operations official or nonofficial in the way;
For the certain part tax behavior agents are connected to expense the time and risk of material losses 
about what becomes known other part of agents which is compelled by arranging to inertial behav-
ior of the contractors, or realize inertial tax behavior by virtue of the conformism; 
Action of “the human factor” causes occurrence in all group of agents of beforehand not planned, 
spontaneously developing delay in change of habitual circuits of carrying out of operations in a di-
rection of their optimization.
In this practical work is based on the perfection of forecasting of taxes receipts, gathering and oblig-
atory payments to the budget and trust funds, increase on this basis of efficiency of budgetary pro-
cess at different levels of the government, development of scientific bases of formation of a tax policy 
of the state.
On the basis of real data, an analysis of the tax behavior of economic entities of the Kharkiv region 
for 2010–2016 was carried out. In the context of branches (types of economic activity) using the 
model of behavior of taxpayers and the method of determining the volume of shadow activity, which 
is based on monetary and financial methods. The results of calculating the share of shadow economy 
by branches of the Kharkiv region are presented in Figure 1.
As can be seen from Figure 1 enterprises of industry and agriculture, hunting, forestry come from 
the “shadow”, as evidenced by the growth of charts of smoothed values. It should be noted that ac-
cording to some calculations, the largest share in the structure of shadow economy in Ukraine, cal-
culated by the financial method, belongs to the industry, which is explained by its significant contri-
bution to the economy of the GFS (28%) at the level of shadowing by 22%.
Another trend is observed in the construction industry – the departure to the “shadow”, where the 
smooth reduction of the smoothed values is clearly monitored. As noted by the authors of the work 
today the scope of shadow turnover for this type of activity in Ukraine is 66%, after the trade – 80%.
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Figure 1. The results of calculating the share of shadow economy by branches of the Kharkiv region
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Prediction of tax revenues to budgets of different levels is based on the proposed model of tax behav-
ior and allows determining the future level of tax revenues not only under the current tax legislation, 
but also with possible changes in it.
Thus, the developed economic-mathematical model of tax behavior of economic entities taking into 
account economic and psychological factors of motivation of taxpayers, as well as the dynamic nature 
of their behavior, allows to increase the accuracy of forecasting of tax revenues and fees to the budget, 
which creates the basis for improving and improving the efficiency of the system. Taxation and is aimed 
at improving the forecasting of tax receipts, fees and mandatory payments to the budget and trust funds, 
increase on the basis of the effectiveness of the budget process at different levels of government, the de-
velopment of scientific foundations for the formation of the state tax policy.
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